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Abstract
Most states have exhausted their unemployment insurance (UI) trust fund and borrowed from the
federal government at least once during the past 35 years. Under such circumstances, states are
required by law to raise UI taxes to replenish their trust funds and to pay off their debts to the federal
government. Since higher UI taxes increase employer costs, replenishment forces states into a
trade-off between economic competitiveness and trust fund adequacy. Competitive pressures have
raised questions about prevailing standards of adequacy and the speed at which they should be
attained. Consequently, several states are contemplating tax reductions despite low reserves. This
article provides background information and analysis intended to clarify issues underlying the UI
policies of New England in general and a tax reduction under consideration in Massachusetts in
particular. The main point is that alternative UI policies should not be judged solely by the yardsticks
of economic competitiveness and trust fund adequacy. Allocative neutrality and economic
stabilization are also relevant concerns. UI systems necessarily force some industries to subsidize
others, thereby distorting the allocation of resources in favor of subsidized firms. Yet, many of the
same features responsible for these allocative distortions affect economic stability. Every UI
alternative entails trade-offs among these rival concerns.
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UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE POLICY IN NEW ENGLAND: 
BACKGROUND AND ISSUES
Robert Tannenwald and Christopher J. O’Leary
Almost two-thirds of the states, and all the New England states except New Hampshire, have
exhausted their unemployment insurance trust fund and borrowed from the federal government at
least once during the past 35 years (U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Under such circumstances,
states are required by law to raise unemployment insurance taxes in order to replenish their trust
funds and to pay off their debts to the federal government. Since higher UI taxes increase employer
costs, replenishment forces states into a trade-off between economic competitiveness and trust fund
adequacy. In recent years, intensifying competitive pressures have caused many policymakers to
question prevailing standards of adequacy and the speed at which they should be attained.
Consequently, several states, including some still in the process of rebuilding reserves depleted by the
last recession, are contemplating tax reductions.
This article provides background information and analysis intended to clarify issues underlying
the unemployment insurance (UI) policies of New England in general and a tax reduction under
consideration in Massachusetts in particular. The article's main point is that alternative UI policies
should not be judged solely by the yardsticks of economic competitiveness and trust fund adequacy.
Allocative neutrality and economic stabilization are also relevant concerns. UI systems necessarily
force some industries to subsidize others, thereby distorting the allocation of resources in favor of
subsidized firms. Yet, many of the same features responsible for these allocative distortions affect
economic stability. Every UI alternative entails trade-offs among these rival concerns.
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The article is divided into five sections. Section I explains the rationale for public provision
of UI. Section II analyzes the structure of UI benefits and evaluates the relative generosity of those
provided by the New England states. Section III explains how benefits are financed and compares UI
tax burdens in New England with those imposed by other states. Section IV explains how certain
features of unemployment insurance taxation create cross-industry subsidies that affect resource
allocation. Evidence is presented concerning the extent of such subsidization in Massachusetts.
Section V discusses the proposed UI tax reductions in Massachusetts and Vermont, as well as some
alternative reforms. 
I. Why Do Governments Provide Unemployment Insurance?
 In an industrialized society, every worker, no matter how competent, faces the risk of
becoming temporarily unemployed. This risk creates a demand for insurance that provides partial
wage replacement between jobs. A market for such insurance will not form spontaneously because
this risk is spread so unevenly. Workers in volatile industries, such as construction and the
manufacture of automobiles, face a higher risk of being laid off than their counterparts in stable
industries, such as public utilities and financial services. If unemployment insurance were voluntary,
the latter group of workers would break away and form their own low-risk pool. As a result, workers
with a severe risk of unemployment would face prohibitively high premiums. To ensure provision of
UI, governments can either require high-risk employees to pay high premiums or arrange for their
     Private supplementary unemployment insurance is available. Workers may purchase--in a fashion similar to credit,1
life and disability insurance on loans--unemployment insurance which guarantees periodic consumer loan payments
during unemployment up to a certain duration. This option may represent a significant supplement in a consumer
society where virtually everything from homes and cars to groceries and air travel may be purchased on credit.
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premiums to be subsidized. The UI system of the United States, partially subsidizes the premiums
covering high-risk workers through a payroll tax collected from employers.1
If governments financed unemployment compensation solely on a "pay as you go" basis,
obligations for social assistance during recessions might become too heavy to bear. By compelling
firms to contribute regularly to a trust fund on behalf of their workers, governments are more likely
to have the fiscal capacity to provide assistance to the unemployed when needed.
Forcing employers to pay UI taxes during "good" times so that benefits can be paid to the
unemployed in "bad" times ("forward funding") stabilizes the economy by smoothing consumption.
As discussed in subsequent sections of this article, several features of UI are designed with
stabilization in mind. Unemployment insurance is considered a social obligation and an instrument of
stabilization throughout the industrialized world. Virtually every economically developed nation
currently provides such insurance to its workers.
II. Unemployment Insurance Benefits
The structure of UI benefits reflects principles of both insurance and social welfare. Under
insurance, eligibility is denied to those who lack the ability or make insufficient effort to avoid the
insured risk. For example, a life insurer will not write a policy for someone in the terminal stages of
a fatal illness; nor will a property insurer grant coverage to a landlord whose buildings are continually
burning down because of faulty electrical wiring. Furthermore, the compensation offered to
     The base period is usually four recent calendar quarters. (In Massachusetts, it is the four most recent quarters.)2
In many cases the minimum earning requirement implies a minimum work requirement as well. For example,
according to one eligibility requirement in Massachusetts, an unemployed worker must have earned an amount during
the base period equal to at least 30 times the weekly UI benefit amount (WBA) for which he or she would otherwise
qualify. A worker's WBA generally equals one-half of his or her average weekly base period wage. Hence, the
earning requirement implies a minimum work requirement of 15 weeks (30 x ½).
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individuals incurring the insured risk reflects premiums paid. By contrast, eligibility and benefit levels
in social welfare programs depend on recipients' presumed need.
Characteristics of UI Benefits Reflecting Insurance Principles
Consistent with the principles of insurance, UI programs limit eligibility to workers who have
demonstrated some attachment to the work force. As a result, former employers would already have
contributed at least a modest amount to the state's UI trust fund. Such rules are also designed to
prohibit an employee from working for a few days, becoming "unemployed" through an arrangement
with his employer, and then collecting benefits. In general, to become insured as of a given date, a
worker must meet the following requirements, among others: 
 1) The worker must have earned a minimum amount and, in some states, worked a minimum
number of weeks during a "base" period.2
 2) The worker must have been working for employers who have employed at least one
worker and/or met a stipulated minimum payroll for a minimum period of time.
  3) The worker must have become unemployed involuntarily and through no fault of his or
her own.
 4) The worker must be capable of, available for, and actively seeking work and must not
refuse suitable employment if offered.
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Limitations on the duration of benefits are also designed to deter workers and employers from
creating and perpetuating unemployment. The maximum period during which an unemployed worker
can receive benefits in a 52-week period is 30 weeks in Massachusetts (Table 1) and Washington
State and 26 weeks in every other state.
Social Welfare Aspects of Benefits
Features of benefit structures that reflect social welfare concerns include minimum benefit
levels, minimum duration periods, dependent allowances, and extended benefits. States mandate
minimum benefits levels and duration periods in order to boost assistance to unemployed workers
whose demonstrated attachment to the labor force barely qualifies them for benefits. Minimum
“weekly benefit amounts” (WBAs) in New England range from $14 in Massachusetts to $41 in Rhode
Island. In Massachusetts, no eligible worker can qualify for less than 10 weeks of benefits during a
52-week "benefit year." In Rhode Island and Maine, the minima are 15 weeks and 21 weeks,
respectively. Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Vermont specify a uniform duration period of 26
weeks for all recipients.
Federal provisions require states to relax the maximum duration limitation in prolonged
periods of high unemployment, when a large percentage of unemployed are likely to exhaust their
benefits. The usual period of extended benefits is 13 weeks subject to a maximum of 39 weeks. The
cost of most extended benefits is shared equally by federal and state governments. During unusually
long and severe economic contractions, the federal government has financed supplemental UI
benefits, most recently from November 1991 through February 1994. Extended and supplemental
benefits are important components of federal stabilization policy.
     This guideline reflects the assumption that the worker at the 20th percentile of the wage distribution earns about3
four-thirds of the average wage.
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Benefit Formulas and Maximum Benefit Limits: Mixed Rationale
According to formulas used in all states, a recipient’s WBA generally depends on his or her
prior earnings. Most states provide for replacement of about one-half of prior earnings, a fraction that
strikes a balance between work disincentive (an insurance concern) and benefit generosity (a social
welfare concern). Since UI is financed almost entirely by payroll taxes on employers (see Section III),
varying benefits with income also strengthens the link between benefits earned and UI contributions
made. 
States set maximum WBAs in part to encourage return to work and to limit assistance to
levels needed only for the purchase of necessities. However, benefit limits also enhance states’
capacity to spread assistance as widely as possible. The lower the maximum, the narrower the range
of incomes for which one-half replacement is achieved but, other things equal, the wider the potential
coverage.
What maximum WBA limit strikes the optimal balance between these conflicting concerns?
Several U.S. Presidents and UI advisory councils have advocated that states achieve one-half wage
replacement for at least 80 percent of their covered workers (Becker 1980; O'Leary 1996). The
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995)--hereafter referred to as the “Advisory
Council”-- recommended that states set their maximum WBAs at two-thirds of the average wage in
UI-covered employment in order to meet this 80 percent standard.  In two New England states,3
Massachusetts and Rhode Island, the maximum WBA with dependent allowance exceeds two-thirds
of the average wage in covered employment (U.S. Department of Labor 1996).
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How Generous Are New England's UI Benefits?
This question is difficult to address with available data because in any given year a state's
benefit disbursements partially reflect its average wage level and the condition and industrial
composition of its economy. Table 1 includes three indicators of generosity that, although somewhat
biased by these factors, are readily available and roughly comparable across states: replacement ratio
(average ratio of benefits to wages, row 10), coverage ratio (percent of workers covered by UI, row
8), and maximum duration of benefits (row 7). Relative to the nation as a whole, Massachusetts ranks
high according to all three indicators. Rhode Island has the highest replacement ratio in the nation,
above-average coverage, and average duration. Maine's and Vermont's coverage rates are low and
their replacement ratios are average. Connecticut's coverage ratio is above average but its
replacement ratio is low. New Hampshire's coverage ratio is average, and its replacement percentage
is one of the lowest in the nation.
In order to control for the impact on these indicators of interstate differences in labor market
conditions, some analysts have computed the benefits of hypothetical representative workers whose
characteristics do not vary across states. Characteristics held constant include such determinants of
UI benefits as number of dependents, previous wage level, and number of weeks worked during the
state's base period. The Advisory Council used this approach to compare the UI benefits of states in
1994. The Council's computed replacement ratios for a single full-time worker earning $10 per hour
are reported in Table 1, row 11. Compared to the actual average replacement ratios reported in row
     Changing the assumed characteristics of the representative worker would again change the relative replacement4
ratios of the New England states, further suggesting the need for caution in making interstate comparisons based on
reported data.
In a forthcoming article, the authors will report on more sophisticated simulations based on current law,
involving multi year analysis, and permitting interstate comparisons of tax burdens for representative employers. Also,
see footnote 10.
     The states of Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania also collect employee contributions. 5
     The federal government imposes additional taxes on employers whose states have borrowed from the federal UI6
trust fund. Interest payments on federal loans cannot be paid out of trust fund balances. Federal rules require that such
payments be financed by UI surtaxes or general revenues. 
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10, those for this hypothetical worker are generally higher and the dispersion narrower. Connecticut's
and New Hampshire's replacement ratios are much higher.  4
III. How Unemployment Insurance is Financed
 Unemployment insurance is financed almost entirely by payroll taxes levied on employers.5
These taxes have both federal and state components. The federal component is nominally 6.2 percent
of the first $7,000 of the wages of covered employees. However, the federal government grants a
credit to employers against all but 0.8 percentage point of the tax, provided that they pay their state
taxes in a timely manner and their state's unemployment compensation program adheres to federal
guidelines. Since the programs of all states have been approved by the federal government, the federal
tax is in effect 0.8 percent of the first $7,000 of wages, or $56 per covered worker.  6
With the proceeds of this tax, the federal government pays for administration of the program
(at both the federal and state levels), assumes partial responsibility for the cost of extended benefits,
and maintains a federal unemployment trust fund from which a state may borrow should it exhaust
its own trust fund. Revenues from state UI taxes finance the regular benefit payments, by far the
     Except in the three states in which an employee tax is also imposed.7
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largest proportion of total UI costs. Since any federal loans to states must eventually be repaid with
interest, each state's UI system is essentially self-financed by its employers.7
The characteristics of state UI taxes vary widely within broad federal parameters. The base
of the state tax must be no lower than the federal base (the first $7,000 of wages paid to an
employee). Many states have a higher base; in New England, bases range from $7,000 in Maine to
$17,600 in Rhode Island, the third highest in the nation (Table 2).
State UI Tax Rates: The Experience Rating Principle
Every state's UI tax structure is based on the experience rating principle. This principle
requires that an employer's tax rate vary positively with its propensity to lay off workers. Thus, each
employer is subject to a different rate, reflecting the degree to which its former employees have drawn
UI benefits.
Experience rating in effect divides the employers of the insured population into separate risk
pools. Workers employed by firms in each pool face a different risk of incurring involuntary
unemployment; the higher the risk, the higher the tax rate faced by the employer. Such a rate structure
promotes allocative efficiency by imposing a price on each employer reflecting the social costs of the
unemployment that the employer generates. Experience rating induces employers to take these costs
into account in decisions concerning technology, pricing, volume, and product mix. When these costs
are not fully internalized, volatile industries, that is, those with persistently high layoff rates, command
an inefficiently large proportion of economic resources.
     The computation period, which varies from state to state, is usually three years prior to the computation date.8
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Whether experience rating promotes economic stabilization is less clear. While it may
discourage layoffs, it may increase the incidence of bankruptcy during recessions by requiring higher
tax payments from firms when they can least afford them. As will be discussed in Section IV, a variety
of modifications to a pure experience-rated system can mitigate this deleterious effect.
How the experience rating principle is implemented. While states have great latitude in
designing experience rating schemes, each uses one of two approaches: "reserve ratio" or "benefit
ratio." Within New England, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Rhode Island use the
reserve ratio approach, while Connecticut and Vermont use the benefit ratio approach (Table 2).
Under the reserve ratio approach, a state government keeps track of each firm's cumulative
tax payments to the state trust fund (since the firm's inception) and the cumulative benefits "charged"
to the firm (paid to workers that it has laid off). As of some "computation date" the government
determines the firm's "reserve"--the difference between its cumulative contributions and benefit
charges. This reserve is then divided by the employer's average annual taxable or total payroll during
a stipulated "computation period" to arrive at the firm's "reserve ratio."  The lower the firm's reserve8
ratio, the higher its tax rate. 
Under the benefit ratio approach, an employer's account reflects only the history of its benefit
charges and payroll. For a given computation period (usually three years ending shortly before the
beginning of the taxable year), the government aggregates the firm's benefit charges and divides by
its taxable or total payroll. The higher the resulting "benefit ratio,” the higher the firm's tax rate.
The reserve ratio approach embodies the concept of "precautionary" balances. Each firm has
an account that builds a surplus of contributions over benefit charges during periods of economic
     Tax rates respond gradually because experience ratings are based on cumulative contributions relative to benefits.9
Thus, the "weight" of each firm's prior history creates an inertia in experience ratings with respect to changes in the
incidence of layoffs.
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expansion, which is then drawn down during recessions or periods of seasonal layoffs. After a surge
in benefit payouts, a firm's tax liability rises gradually, but then remains at a higher level for a long
period of time and falls slowly in response to improving conditions.  By contrast, the benefit ratio9
method is closer to a "pay as you go" approach in which payments for benefit charges are made with
a lag. A surge in benefits is paid for relatively rapidly; then, payments fall steeply once the benefit
charges have been "paid off" (Figure 1). Thus, other things equal, a UI tax system based on the
reserve ratio approach is less procyclical than the benefit ratio approach.
Are New England's UI Tax Burdens Relatively High?
As in interstate comparisons of benefit levels, one should control for economic conditions in
interstate comparisons of UI tax burdens. Given the experience rating principle, employers' tax
burdens rise in response to an increase in unemployment rates. In a national recession, employers in
states enduring an especially severe contraction usually experience a rise in their UI tax burden
relative to employers in less affected states. The opposite occurs when their state enjoys unusually
rapid economic growth. Therefore, it is desirable to compare states' UI tax burdens averaged over
several years encompassing a variety of economic conditions.
Table 3 compares the 50 states and the District of Columbia in terms of employer tax
payments ("contributions") as a percentage of the wages of covered employees averaged for 1988,
1991, and 1995. New England's economy was strong relative to the nation's in 1988, weak in 1991,
and about average in 1995. For these three years, Rhode Island's average tax burden was the second
     One should also control for industry mix in interstate comparisons of UI tax burdens, since states with inherently10
volatile industries have relatively high UI costs and tax burdens. Interstate comparisons of tax burdens and benefit
levels that take both economic conditions and industry mix into account will be presented by the authors in a subsequent
article.
(Also, see footnote 4.)
How much a state's relative UI tax burden affects its overall economic competitiveness is controversial
because economists disagree on who actually bears the burden of UI taxes. According to recent studies, much of their
burden is borne in the long run by workers rather than employers in the form of lower compensation. However, in
the intermediate run much of the burden of these taxes probably falls on employers, thereby increasing their cost of
doing business. Furthermore, because an employer's UI tax burden varies with economic conditions and is therefore
difficult to predict, it is arguably an especially sensitive issue for employers considering a state as a potential location
for a new facility. 
     Indeed a perfectly experience-rated system could not function because firms with a high propensity to lay off11
workers would face prohibitvely high tax burdens.
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highest in the nation; Maine's, Massachusetts', and Vermont's were above the national median;
Connecticut's was slightly below the median, while New Hampshire's was lower than that of every
other state except South Dakota.10
IV. Cross-Industry Subsidies and Departures from Experience Rating
 No state's UI tax system adheres unswervingly to the experience-rating principle.  Firms11
generating the largest benefit outlays pay a disproportionately small share of contributions into the
system. Such firms are partially subsidized by others. Firms enjoying the largest subsidies tend to face
highly cyclical or seasonal demand for their products. The main features of UI financing responsible
for such subsidization are maximum and minimum tax rates, time lags, exclusions, and solvency
measures.
Maximum and Minimum Tax Rates
 All states constrain the range of employer tax rates. At some point, a firm's tax rate stops
rising no matter how much its experience rating "worsens" and stops falling no matter how much its
     According to simulations performed by Hunt and O'Leary (1989), changes in layoff rates affect reserve percentages as12
many as 15 years into the future.
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experience rating "improves." For example, Massachusetts currently imposes a maximum tax rate of
8.1 percent on all firms with a reserve ratio of -14 percent of taxable payroll or less and a minimum
rate of 2.2 percent on firms with a positive reserve ratio of 14.5 percent or higher (schedule D in
Figure 2). A firm whose reserve ratio is -0.20 percent is subject to the same tax rate as one with a
reserve ratio of -14 percent, even though the former has imposed greater net costs on its state’s UI
system. At the same time, a firm with a positive reserve ratio of 20 percent must pay a 2.2 percent
rate of tax, the same as a firm with a ratio of only 14.5 percent.
Under the reserve ratio approach, a firm in the maximum tax bracket might ultimately become
liable for all benefits paid to its laid-off workers if its employment eventually stabilizes. This would
be so because the reserve ratio reflects a firm's propensity to lay off workers many years into the
past.  Consequently, a high historical layoff rate would slow adjustment to lower tax brackets after12
the incidence of layoffs falls. Similarly, the high level of reserves built up by firms paying the minimum
tax rate, despite few layoffs, would slow the increase in tax rates if their propensity to separate
workers rose. However, Massachusetts diminishes the potential for such long-run accounting
adjustments by constraining the range of possible reserve ratios to between -25 percent and 50
percent. The effect of such constraints is illustrated in the accompanying box. 
States using the benefit ratio approach, such as Connecticut and Vermont, are less likely to
recoup the cost of benefits charged to firms with consistently high layoff rates. Consider the situation
of firms at the maximum tax rate for more than three consecutive years. Since under the benefit ratio
approach an employer’s experience rating generally reflects its behavior only during the three
     The Advisory Council (1995, p. 81) estimated the percentage of total benefit charges that were "ineffectively13
charged" in 1993. It defined ineffectively charged benefits as those that neither draw on accumulated past taxes nor
trigger additional current taxes because they are paid to former workers of employers who are at the maximum tax
rate. The percentages for the New England states were: Connecticut, 37.3; Maine, 25.5; Massachusetts, 19.9; New
Hampshire, 20.6; Rhode Island, 19.3; and Vermont, 21.5. The national median was 18.4.
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previous years, these firms will never become liable for some of their previous benefit charges. By
similar reasoning, a firm with stable employment for more than three years does not get full credit for
its "good" behavior should subsequent economic adversity propel it into a tax bracket above the
minimum.
How important are firms clustered at minimum and maximum employer tax rates to the
economies of the New England states? How does clustering at these extremes differ across industries?
Figure 3 shows, for all Massachusetts employers and for selected industries, the  percentage of total
payroll accounted for by employers at the maximum and minimum tax rates in 1995. In all industries,
firms accounting for about 5 percent of payroll were clustered in each extreme tax bracket. At the
end of a recession, the share of all firms at the maximum rate would be higher.13
The impact of constraining the range of possible reserve ratios is illustrated by the following
fictitious example: Up-and-Down, Inc. has been in existence fo r 10 years. The firm’s annual taxable
payroll during its “computational” period (for the purpose of calculating its reserve ratio) was
$250 million. During its existence, Up-and-Down has paid $50 million in UI taxes, $150 million
has been charged to its UI ac count. Thus, its reserve account would be $50 million - $150 million,
or -$100 million. In the absen ce of any minimum value for reserve ratios, Up-and-Down’s reserve
ratio would be (-$100 million)/$250 million, or -40 percent. Under Massachusetts law, however,
the Commonwealth would set the firm’s reserve ratio to -25 percent, the statutory minimum, by
setting its account balance equal to -$50 million. With a reserve ratio of either -40 percent or-25
percent, the firm’s tax rate would be the maximum rate, which, under the current schedule (“D”
in Figure 2), is 8.1 percent.
Over the next year, the firm’s fortunes improve dramatically. It contributes $20 million
in UI taxes and no benefits are charged to its account. Its payroll during its computation period
     In the cases of public utilities, banking, insurance, and personal services, the high concentration of payroll at14
the minimum is primarily a reflection of these industries’ inherent stability. In the case of eating and drinking places,
a seasonal industry with a relatively high turnover rate, a number of factors could be responsible. Perhaps a relatively
low percentage of employees who get laid off are eligible for UI. Because the industry is labor intensive and has a
high rate of labor turnover, UI is potentially high relative to total payroll for owners of eating and drinking establishments.
As a result, they may manage their UI accounts very carefully. Finally, the low wages paid to workers in the industry--and,
therefore, the industry’s high ratio of taxable wages to total payroll--may boost taxes paid as a percentage of total wages and
therefore employers’ experience ratios.
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remains at $250 million. If its account balance had been -$100 million, now it would be -$100
million + $20 million, or -$80 mil lion, and its reserve ratio would be -$80 million/$250 million, or
-.32. Since this is still below -.14, the firm would still be subject to the maximum tax rate of 8.1
percent. Howeve r, given that its account balance had been constrained to equal -$50 million, this
balance now equals -$50 million + $30 million, or -$20 million, and its reserve ratio is -$20
million/$250 million, or -0.08. As a result, under Schedule D the firm’s tax rate falls to 6.9 percent.
In this manner, the Commonwealth’s reserve ratio floor hinders its ability to recoup subsidies
benefiting firms at the maximum tax rate. On the other hand, the floor provides an incentive for
firms with a history of extensive unemployment to curtail layoffs.
 
Clustering patterns differed sharply across industries, however. In construction, firms at the
maximum tax rate accounted for 37 percent of total payroll. A similarly skewed distribution was
exhibited in agriculture and in mining. Slightly above-average clustering at the maximum was found
in the manufacture of electrical machinery (SIC 36), the 2-digit manufacturing industry with the
largest employment in the Commonwealth. These findings are not surprising, given the inherent
volatility and seasonality of agriculture, mining, and construction, and the structural "downsizing" that
the Commonwealth's manufacturers of electrical machinery have experienced over the past several
years. 
By contrast, almost one-quarter of the payroll in public utilities was paid out by firms at the
minimum tax rate. Payroll was also concentrated heavily at the minimum in banking, insurance, eating
and drinking places, and personal services.14
     As shown in Figure 4, the average employer tax burden in Vermont has borne little relation to benefit payout15
rates in recent years. The reasons for this unusual pattern are explained later in this section in the text and in the
accompanying box.
     Lags also weaken the deterrent to laying off workers inherent in pure experience rating.16
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Time Lags
In New England, an employer's tax rate for a given year is based on its experience rating
computed between three and six months before the date the rate takes effect. Furthermore, an
employer's experience rating typically reflects its actual behavior over several years preceding this
computation date. In Connecticut, for example, an employer's tax rate for 1996 depends on its benefit
ratio computed as of June 30, 1995. This ratio, in turn, is based on the total benefits charged to its
account as a percentage of its total payroll during 1992, 1993, and 1994. 
The lagged response of tax burdens to benefit payout rates in New England can be seen in
Figure 4.  In effect, these lags represent interest-free “loans.” Like maximum tax rates, they serve15
the useful counter cyclical function of protecting firms in all industries from a sharp increase in their
UI tax liability at a time when they usually can least afford it. Nevertheless, firms in highly cyclical
industries or firms that utilize seasonal workers extensively benefit disproportionately from these
loans. Consequently, time lags exacerbate the allocative distortions created by the UI system.16
Exclusions
Certain categories of UI expenditures are not charged to particular employers. Examples
include the state-financed portion of extended benefits, benefits paid to former employees of firms
that have gone out of business, and benefits for dependents. These exclusions are not motivated
entirely by forbearance for firms in financial distress. Thus, the costs of dependent allowances are
     Within New England, the conditions that trigger supplementary solvency measures take a variety of forms. In17
New Hampshire such measures are imposed at the discretion of the commissioner of unemployment insurance
whenever he or she deems the solvency of the state's trust fund to be in jeopardy. In Connecticut and Massachusetts,
whether such measures are undertaken depends on the ratio of the trust fund balance to total wages of covered
employees. Rhode Island's statutes stipulate the determining factor as the ratio of the trust fund balance to total taxable
wages of covered employees. In Maine and Vermont, the adequacy of the trust fund balance in effect is judged by
the number of months of benefits that the surplus could finance. In evaluating the number of months in reserve, Maine
assumes the annual benefit payout rate (benefits as a percentage of total wages) averaged over the previous 15 years.
Vermont assumes the highest annual benefit payout rate during the previous 10 years, a more stringent criterion that
in recent years has created a large trust fund surplus (see the box, below).
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"socialized," or spread uniformly among all employers, partly on the theory that society as a whole
has a moral obligation to provide for the children of laid-off workers.
Solvency Measures
Ideally, "forward funded" UI trust funds should remain solvent even during periods of severe
economic contraction. UI taxes collected during periods of economic recovery and expansion should
be sufficient to fund UI benefits during recessions. In fact, the trust fund of every New England state
except New Hampshire has been entirely depleted at some point during the last 25 years, forcing the
state to borrow from the federal government (Figure 5). Even New Hampshire has experienced years
in which the balance in its trust fund has been uncomfortably low. As noted in the introduction, the
need to borrow from the federal trust fund has not been limited to New England.
In order to rebuild depleted trust fund reserves quickly and to reduce the need for future
borrowing, states automatically impose tax increases when their reserves fall below a certain
threshold.  Because of the manner in which these supplementary taxes are generally structured, they17
indirectly affect the degree to which UI systems promote allocative efficiency. Within New England,
many of these measures raise each employer's tax rate by a constant percentage-point amount.
     The laws of Connecticut and New Hampshire provide for only one rate schedule but give the state the authority18
to raise the tax rate in each bracket by a uniform percentage-point amount to maintain an adequate trust fund balance.
Such tax increases are tantamount to parallel upward rate shifts.
     Rate schedules provided for by the laws of Maine depart further from the experience rating principle than those19
in Massachusetts. As the rate schedule is shifted upward, the percentage-point rate increase is significantly larger for
the best-rated firms than the worst-rated firms. Under the lightest schedule, rates range from 0.5 percent to 6.4
percent; under the heaviest schedule, rates range from 2.8 percent to 7.5 percent. Thus, in moving from the lowest
to the highest schedule, firms at the minimum tax rate experience a rate increase of 1.9 percentage points, while the
comparable increase for firms at the maximum tax rate is only 1.1 percent. In Vermont and Rhode Island, however,
each upward shift produces a percentage-point rate increase that is inversely related to the quality of the employer’s
experience rating.
19
Consequently, they violate the experience rating principle, thereby subsidizing volatile industries at
the expense of stable ones.
Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont implement supplementary solvency
measures by shifting among alternative unemployment tax rate schedules provided for by law.  For18
example, the laws of Massachusetts provide for eight alternative schedules (Figure 2). When the trust
fund balance as a percentage of total wages paid to covered employees is 3 percent or more, schedule
AA is in effect. When this percentage is below 0.8 percent, the heaviest schedule, schedule G, is
imposed. As the schedule becomes heavier, the tax rate in each experience-rating bracket increases
by 0.4 percentage point. Consequently, firms having laid off no workers experience the same
percentage-point increase in tax rate as those firms having laid off a large fraction of their work force,
a violation of the experience rating principle.  19
In recent years, both Connecticut and New Hampshire have introduced modifications to their
solvency measures that conform more closely with the experience rating principle. In the first quarter
of 1996, New Hampshire, enjoying a healthy surplus in its trust fund, awarded all employers with a
     The New Hampshire Commissioner of Employment Security has the authority to subtract, on a quarterly basis,20
0.5 percentage point from the tax rates applicable to employers with a positive reserve ratio whenever the balance in
the state's unemployment trust fund equals or exceeds $200 million (currently about 14 percent of statewide covered
payroll). Further successive across-the-board reductions of 0.5 percentage point are authorized when the balance
equals or exceeds $225 million and $250 million. Notwithstanding these reductions, an absolute minimum tax rate of
0.01 percent is required (New Hampshire Laws, 282-A:82).
     Connecticut also floated bonds to pay off its federal debt immediately in order to reduce interest costs that21
ultimately would have had to be passed on to employers. The interest rate charged by the federal government would
have exceeded 7 percent; the average interest rate on the bonds was 4.1 percent.
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positive reserve ratio (contributions exceeding benefit payouts) a 1-percentage-point reduction in
their tax rates.  No such reduction was granted to firms with a negative ratio. 20
In 1993, Connecticut floated bonds to eliminate a persistent trust fund deficit and to repay
federal loans. In order to pay off these bonds, the state levied a dedicated assessment on each
employer; the assessment's value as a percentage of the employer's payroll varied directly with the
firm's propensity to lay off workers. Had Connecticut not paid off its federal debt in this manner, the
uniform federal unemployment tax rate imposed on the state's employers would have risen from 0.8
percent to 1.7 percent and kept increasing by 0.3 percentage point per year until the debt had been
paid off. These federal tax increases would have come on top of the state's solvency assessment,
currently a flat 1.5 percent of all taxable payrolls.21
Estimates of the Degree of Cross-Industry Subsidization, by State: The Experience Rating Index
The extent of cross-industry subsidization varies roughly with the degree of adherence to the
experience rating principle. A crude indicator of the degree to which a state adheres to this principle
is the "Experience Rating Index" (ERI), published annually for each state by the U.S. Department of
Labor. The index equals the percentage of total unemployment benefits paid by a state that is charged
to specific employers for the purpose of experience rating. The lower the index value, the greater the
     The unpaid UI tax liability of a failed employer is assumed by the state system as a whole.22
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departure of the state from full experience rating. The ERI for each New England state from 1988
through 1995 is presented in Figure 6.
In every state except Vermont, the ERI was lower in the recession years of 1990 to 1992 than
in preceding or following years, a pattern found throughout the nation. During recessions, the
concentration of firms at the maximum tax rate becomes greater and the business failure rate rises.22
States must finance the surge in benefit payouts by running down their trust fund surplus until firms'
experience ratings respond, with a lag. As a result, automatic upward shifts in rate schedules and
other solvency measures are more likely to be triggered.
Vermont's ERI has trended downward in recent years, even though the state's economy has
recovered from the recession in the early 1990s. Two factors account for this anomaly. First, in
Vermont a firm's unemployment tax rate is determined by its relative experience rating, not its 
Vermont's Rules for Selecting an Unemployment Insurance Tax Rate Schedule
In Vermont, the choice of rate schedule for any year y depends on the following ratio:
(BALANCE/TOTAL WAGES)
 (BENEFITS /TOTAL WAGES )high high
where:
BALANCE = the trust fund balance on December 31 of y-1
TOTAL WAGES = the total wages paid to covered employees in y-1
BENEFITS  = the highest amount of benefits paid out of the trust fund in anyhigh
consecutive 12-month period that ended between December 31 of y-11 and
December 31 of y-1
TOTAL WAGES  = the total wages paid to covered employees during said high
12-month period.
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This formula in effect directs Vermont to identify the 12-month interval during the previous 10
years during which its benefit payout rate was high est and to maintain reserves sufficient to finance
a whole year's worth of benefits at that peak payout rate.
This formula was adopted as Vermont was recovering from the 1973-75 recession, a
severe one throughout New England. In 1975, the state's ratio of benefits paid to total wages of
covered employees was .0285, higher than all states except Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan,
New Jersey, and R hode Island. Its trust fund had incurred a deficit for two consecutive years, and
it owed the federal trust fund over $28 million or about 2.8 percent of covered payroll. In 1977,
when the formula was adopted,  Vermont's heaviest rate schedule went into effect. The formula, the
1981-82 recession, and a policy of continued borrowing from the federal government (to take
advantage of interest-free loans), kept the h eaviest rate schedule continually in effect for more than
a decade. The average employer tax rate actually rose after 1982 and peaked in 1985 at 4.06
percent, the highest in the reg ion. It remained close to 4 percent until 1988, even though the 1982-
87 period was one of rapid economic growth and low unemployment in Vermont.
absolute one. As its experience rating deteriorates, its tax rate, absent a schedule shift, will not rise
if other employers' experience ratings deteriorate at the same rate. Its tax rate will rise only if its
experience rating has deteriorated relatively rapidly.
Under such a rule, one might reasonably question Vermont's ability to maintain the solvency
of its trust fund other than in years of extremely low unemployment. In fact, during the past eight
years Vermont's trust fund has consistently been one of the best reserved in the country. This
apparent paradox can be explained by the state's strict solvency standards, which have kept high tax
rate schedules in effect for many years, even during periods of robust economic growth (see the box).
As a result of these strict standards, by 1990 Vermont's trust fund balance as a percentage of wages
paid to covered employees was the largest in the nation. The state financed rising benefit payout rates
during the most recent recession mostly by drawing down part of this large surplus rather than by
     Nevertheless, as the average benefit payout rate rose and tax rates did not, the state's Experience Rating Index23
(ERI) declined.
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raising tax rates. The mildness of the recession in Vermont relative to the contractions in other New
England helped the state to keep UI tax rates stable.23
Estimates of Subsidy Rates by Industry
Data needed to estimate cross industry subsidies were available only for Massachusetts.
Estimates were made for three periods: 1988 to 1992, 1993 to 1996, and 1988 to 1996. The measure
used (developed by Munts and Asher 1980) was net subsidy as a fraction of wages (SUBRATE). For
any given period, SUBRATE is equal to:
3BENEFITS - 3CONTRIBUTIONS    
3TOTAL WAGES x $1,000
where:
3BENEFITS = the total dollar amount of benefits paid to employers in industry x during
the period
3CONTRIBUTIONS = the total dollar amount of contributions made by employers in
 industry x during the period
3TOTAL WAGES = the total dollar amount of wages paid by employers in industry x to
covered employees during the period.
Results are presented in Table 4. SUBRATE was positive for Massachusetts' employers as
a whole for the years 1988 to 1992, a period during which the Commonwealth had to borrow from
the federal UI trust fund. With the recovery, the Commonwealth paid off its debt and began to rebuild
its own trust fund. As a result, SUBRATE was negative between 1993 and 1996.
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Given the pattern of clustering at minimum and maximum tax rates exhibited in Figure 3, it
is not surprising that construction is the sector of the Massachusetts economy most heavily subsidized
by the Commonwealth's UI system. For the entire 1988-96 period, construction firms drew a net
subsidy of over $25 per $1,000 of payroll, while employers as a whole were making a net contribution
of $1.40 per $1,000. Over the nine-year period, the construction sector received 22 percent of all UI
benefits and made only 9 percent of all contributions, while accounting for 5 percent of total wages
paid to covered employees.
Construction received such a disproportionately large share of UI benefits during this period
not only because of its inherent cyclical sensitivity and seasonality but also because Massachusetts’
real estate markets were unusually volatile. Between 1982 and 1987, the inflation-adjusted value of
contracts awarded for residential construction within the Commonwealth almost quadrupled, while
those for nonresidential construction expanded by 75 percent. As a result, construction employment
rose by over 80 percent from 1982 to 1988. In the ensuing “bust,” this sector lost all of these job
gains and more (Figure 7). More than one in every six Massachusetts employees who lost their jobs
during the last recession were construction workers. While it has grown steadily in recent years,
construction employment is still well below its previous peak.
Manufacturing was the only other major sector to have been subsidized, although its net
subsidy, 20 cents per $1,000 of payroll, was very small. The sector accounted for 28 percent of all
benefits, 25 percent of contributions, and 29 percent of all payroll. Among 2-digit industries
accounting for at least 2 percent of total wages paid out since 1988, the most heavily subsidized were
special trade contractors, the manufacture of transportation equipment, and the manufacture of
     Specifically, after three years of a temporary freeze on UI rates at schedule D, rates are scheduled to rise to24
schedule E. The proposal would lower rates to schedule C (see Figure 2). Rates were also temporarily reduced in
1992.
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industrial and commercial machinery and computer equipment. The largest subsidizers of other
industries have been eating and drinking places, food stores, health services, and apparel trade.
V. Issues Raised by Recently Proposed
Reductions in UI Tax Rates
Reductions in UI rates have recently been enacted or are currently under consideration in 14
states, including Connecticut, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Vermont is considering
a permanent relaxation of its solvency requirements that in the short run would reduce UI tax rates
by between 0.5 and 0.2 percentage point, depending on firms’ experience rating. By contrast,
Massachusetts is considering a temporary measure that would cut UI tax rates by 0.4 percentage
point across-the-board this year. Under current law, rates are scheduled to increase by 0.4 percentage
point.  UI tax reductions under consideration in Connecticut and Rhode Island would apply only to24
new employers (National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers Compensation,
1997).
Proponents of permanent rate reductions argue that they would enhance their state’s
economic competitiveness. Competitiveness is less of a consideration in temporary rate cuts since
rates usually return to their previous level after the cuts expire, precluding long-terms reductions in
employer costs. Advocates of temporary cuts generally argue either that the level of their state’s trust
fund is adequate (even if relatively low) or that reserves will become adequate within a few years.
Since the economic outlook is so sanguine, both in New England and rest of the nation, they see an
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acceptable risk in slowing the rate of reserve accumulation and value in allowing employers to keep
some dollars otherwise earmarked for UI contributions. Moreover, they reason that, should current
economic forecasts prove too optimistic and trust fund reserves are exhausted during the next
recession, states will still have the option of borrowing from the federal government to benefit pay
benefit obligations. 
A central issue in the debate over both temporary and permanent rate cuts, therefore, is what
constitutes an adequate level of reserves. The most frequently used standard is the high cost multiple
(HCM), which the U.S. Department of Labor defines as:
HCM = TF/HCR
where: 
TF = trust fund balance as a percentage of wages in covered employment
HCR = high cost rate, or the highest ratio of benefits to wages in covered employment
for any 12- month period in the state's history.
In the past, the U.S. Labor Department has endorsed an HCM of 1.5 as a solvency guideline
(Advisory Council, 1995). In effect the standard requires trust fund reserves sufficient to finance 18
months of benefits paid out at the highest cost rate that the state has ever experienced. In 1996Q4,
only Mississippi, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah exceeded this extremely conservative standard,
although Vermont came close at 1.43. The five other New England states fell far short (Table 5,
column 1).
As the Advisory Council discussed in its report to the President and Congress (1995), the 1.5
HCM may be too strict. The most serious recession in a state’s history since the inception of UI may
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have been produced by a unique confluence of factors that is highly unlikely to be repeated.
Consequently, the Council recommended an alternative, less stringent standard that takes into account
UI experience over a shorter historical period. Specifically, each state should accumulate reserves
sufficient to provide at least one year of benefits paid out at the average of the three highest cost rates
recorded during the past 20 years. The Advisory Council also offered a variety of alternative
standards.
The degree to which each New England state had achieved these various standards as of
1996Q4 is summarized in Table 5, columns 2 through 7. Among all the state, more than one-half had
met at least one these standards, and almost two-thirds had met the standard recommended by the
Advisory Council (column 4). Within New England, New Hampshire and Vermont both substantially
exceeded all six standards. By contrast, the reserves of the other four New England states were well
below every guideline. 
Nevertheless, with the economy performing so well, some of these four states have a
reasonable chance of achieving at least one of these standards within a few years. Official 1997
projections of the Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training provide evidence that the
Commonwealth may be one of these states, even with a rate cut. According to these projections, the
Commonwealth’s UI tax rate jumps by 0.8 percentage point across-the-board in 1998 (from schedule
C to schedule E in Figure 2), after the proposed temporary rate cut expires. By the end of 1998 trust
fund balances exceed the adequacy standards presented in columns 6 and 7 of Table 5. By the end
of 1999, reserves also exceed the standard presented in column 3 and the standard preferred by
Advisory Council (column 4). In addition, reserves come within 1 percent of attaining the standards
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presented in columns 2 and 5. These projections assume that through the end of 1999 the state’s
annual unemployment rate averages about 4.0 percent. 
Two important issues that should be considered in evaluating a one-year rate cut for 1997 are
the probability that its expiration date will be extended and that a recession will begin before trust
funds accumulate adequate reserves. Opponents of temporary tax cuts note that the lifetimes of such
cuts are often extended. For example, Massachusetts has extended freezes on its UI rate schedule (at
schedule D) every year since 1993. Furthermore, noting that the current recovery has been long-lived
by postwar standards, opponents believe that the risk of a recession sometime within three years is
substantial. They therefore fear that states implementing rate reductions run an unacceptable risk of
exhausting their trust fund reserves during the next recession, incurring costly federal debt, and
possibly confronting the need to curtail benefits. They also caution that, if the availability of federal
loans induces many states to relax efforts to accumulate reserves, the federal government might make
credit more expensive or reduce the interest payments that it pays to states on their reserves if their
trust fund balance is small. Finally, they argue that if states forego rate cuts now and current
optimistic economic forecasts prove accurate, growth in reserves will permit rates to drop later. As
a result, within a few years, rates are likely to be the same with or without short-term UI tax relief.
The projections of the Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training support this
argument.
Largely absent from the debate over proposed rate cuts in both Massachusetts and Vermont
has been any discussion of the impact of shifts in rate schedules on allocative efficiency. As explained
in Section IV, uniform upward shifts in statutory rates violate the experience rating principle and
therefore accentuate allocative distortions. Uniform downward shifts have the opposite effect.
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However, if slowing reserve accumulation ultimately sacrificed adequacy, it might necessitate future
uniform upward shifts in rates to restore solvency. In this manner, UI cuts implemented today could
indirectly aggravate allocative distortions over the long run.
Whatever reserve level or tax schedule Massachusetts and other states deem optimal for now,
they might wish to consider more permanent reforms of their UI tax structure that would enhance
allocative efficiency by reducing cross-industry subsidization. Examples of such measures include the
following:
!Reducing minimum tax rates and raising maximum tax rates. Rhode Island, which is
currently considering this option, has 9 different UI tax rate schedules. Each schedule has 20 different
rates that differ by 0.1 percentage point. As in other states, which schedule is effective in any given
year depends on the level of reserves in the state’s UI trust fund. In each schedule, the minimum rate
is applicable to employers with a reserve ratio equal to or greater than 15.5 percent, while the
maximum rate applies to those with a ratio equal to or less than -16 percent. A bill currently before
the state’s legislature would add a bracket to the bottom and four brackets to the top of each rate
schedule. As a result, the minimum tax rate in each schedule would fall by between 0.2 and 0.4
percentage point and would apply to employers with a reserve ratio equal to or greater than 17
percent. The maximum rate in each schedule would rise by 1.6 percentage point and would apply to
employers with a reserve ratio equal to or less than -24 percent.
!Reducing time lags in the determination of an employer's tax rate for a given year. As
noted in section IV, an employer’s tax rate for a given year is usually determined on the basis of its
experience rating calculated three to six months before the year begins. Given modern computation
technology, a lag of less than six months is achievable.
     These suggestions, among others, have been made by Brechling and Laurence (1995).25
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!Making solvency measures conform more closely to the experience rating principle. For
example, upward shifts in rate schedules could raise tax rates for employers with poor experience
ratings by more percentage points than the rates for those with good ratings, instead of raising tax
rates by a uniform percentage-point amount (such as shown in Figure 2).25
In addition to promoting allocative neutrality, these reforms would permit UI tax reductions
for many relatively stable industries, and give firms in more volatile industries a stronger incentive to
reduce labor turnover. On the negative side, these measures would impose additional fiscal stress on
employers with shrinking payrolls and little cash flow. During a recession, when layoffs and cash flow
problems are widespread, the subsidies built into the UI system provide a cushion to severely stressed
firms across all industries, thereby diminishing the incidence of bankruptcy. Reducing these subsidies
would weaken this stabilizing influence.
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Table 1
Selected Unemployment Insurance Benefit Characteristics for the New England States and U.S. Average 
(as of January 1997 unless otherwise noted)
Connecticut Maine Massachusetts NewHampshire Rhode Island Vermont
United States
Average
(1) Weekly Benefit Amount
(WBA) Formula
1/26 of average of two
highest quarter
earnings (HQE)









(2) Minimum WBA $15 $36 $14 $32 $41 $31 $35
(3) Maximum WBA $353 $250 $362 $228 $336 $217 $248
(4) Dependent Allowance $10 each up to lower
of $50 or ½ WBA
$10 each up to
½ WBA
$25 each up to
½ WBA
None Greater of $10 or
5% of WBA each
None n.c.
(5) Maximum WBA with
Dependent Allowance $403 $315 $543 $228 $420 $217 $231
(6) Minimum Duration
(Weeks) 
26 21 10 26 15 26 15
(7) Maximum Duration
(Weeks)
26 26 30 26 26 26 26
(8) Percent of Workers
Covered
88.4% 77.7% 90.9% 83.8% 85.1% 80.2% 83.1%a
(9) Average Weekly Benefit
Amount (AWBA)
$228 $174 $261 $161 $235 $167 $178
(10) AWBA as a Percentage
of State Average
Weekly Wage
34.6% 42.0% 43.0% 32.0% 49.0% 40.1% 40.1%






$10 per hour, 1994
50% 48% 50% 45% 60% 52% 50%b
Excluding the District of Columbia.   Data for Michigan are not available.a  b
n.c.:  Not comparable.
Source:  Author’s calculations; U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Service, Division of Actuarial Services, UI Data  Summary,
various issues; and Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, January 5, 1997; and Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation (1995), Table 10-2, pp. 148-49.
Table 2
Selected Unemployment Insurance Tax Provisions in the New England States, 1996


















6 months 5 months 3 months 5 months 6 months 6 months
Number of Tax
Brackets
50 31 45 48 20 21
Taxable Wage Base $12,000 $7,000 $10,800 $8,000 $17,600 $8,000
(1)  Benefits charged in the 3 preceding years divided by taxable payrolls totaled over the 3 preceding years. Computed as of June 30; effective
January 1.
(2)  Net contributions as of the prior July 31 divided by average annual payroll in the 3 preceding years. Calculated as of June 30. Effective January 1.
(3)  Net reserves as of September 30 in the preceding year divided by taxable payroll for the preceding year. Effective January 1.
(4)  Net reserve balance as of January 31 divided by average annual taxable payrolls over the prior 3 years. Effective July 1.
(5)  Net reserves as of June 30 divided by average annual taxable payroll over the prior 3 years. Effective January 1.
(6)  Ratio of total benefits charged to total payrolls over the 3 preceding years, as of the preceding December 31. Effective July 1.
Source:  Commerce Clearing House, Unemployment Insurance Reports.
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Table 3
UI Taxes as a Percent of Total Wages, by State, Average of 1988, 1991, and 1995 a
State Average Rank
United States   .86
Alaska 2.13 1













Arkansas   .98 15
Louisiana   .97 16
Ohio   .97 16
Montana   .95 18
Iowa   .92 19
North Dakota   .92 19
New Jersey   .90 21
Minnesota   .88 22
Kentucky   .87 23
New Mexico   .87 23
Delaware   .84 25
Texas   .81 26
New York   .80 27
Nevada   .79 28
Hawaii   .78 29
Connecticut   .76 30
California   .75 31
South Carolina   .69 32
Utah   .69 32
Kansas   .68 34
Oklahoma   .67 35
Colorado   .65 36
Maryland   .64 37
District of Columbia   .63 38
Tennessee   .61 39
Mississippi   .60 40
Missouri   .53 41
Georgia   .51 42
Alabama   .51 42
Arizona   .46 44
Indiana   .44 45
Florida   .43 46
North Carolina   .40 47
Nebraska   .40 47
Virginia   .36 49
New Hampshire   .35 50
South Dakota   .30 51
Does not include special assessments levied on employers to repay Federal UI debt, such as that introduced in Connecticut in 1993 (see text).a  
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration , Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394,




Net UI Subsidy Per $1000 of Total Wages, 1988 to 1996, Massachusetts, by Industry (SUBRATE )a
INDUSTRY 1988-92 1993-96 1988-96
CONSTRUCTION
   Building construction SIC 15 27.90 14.14 23.26
   Other heavy construction SIC 16 46.86 33.87 40.62
   Special trades SIC 17 28.80 14.39 23.07
   Total 30.37 17.18 25.21
MANUFACTURING
   Food SIC 20 2.12 -5.75 -1.57
   Tobacco SIC 21 -8.04 -19.47 -10.01
   Textiles SIC 22 2.04 -7.67 -2.93
   Apparel SIC 23 11.16 -1.04 6.04
   Lumber SIC 24 11.70 -3.26 5.72
   Furniture SIC 25 10.56 -5.65 3.94
   Paper SIC 26 1.58 -5.17 -1.54
   Printing SIC 27 .02 -6.12 -2.88
   Chemicals SIC 28 -0.88 -4.59 -2.71
   Petroleum SIC 29 26.33 12.93 19.59
   Rubber SIC 30 1.35 -7.22 -2.86
   Leather SIC 31 9.06 -4.19 3.86
   Stone, clay, and glass SIC 32 5.78 -2.17 2.42
   Primary metals SIC 33 3.62 -5.37 -0.32
   Fabricated metals SIC 34 3.18 -5.33  -0.89
   Nonelectrical machinery SIC 35 3.06 -2.65 0.70
   Electrical machinery SIC 36 0.31 -1.29 -0.38
   Transportation equipment SIC 37 6.11 1.59 4.36
   Instruments SIC 38 0.96 -4.56 -1.68
   Miscellaneous SIC 39 1.26 -7.58 -2.98
   Total 2.50 -3.55 -0.20
TRANSPORTATION, COMMUNICATIONS, AND PUBLIC UTILITIES
   Transit SIC 41 7.85 -4.79 1.60
   Trucking SIC 42 3.56 -6.27 -1.03
   Water transport SIC 44 9.14 7.99 8.61
   Air transport SIC 45 -1.06 -7.42 -4.25
   Pipelines, except gas SIC 46 -0.67 -8.46 -2.30
   Transport services SIC 47 0.32 -8.21 -3.90
   Communications SIC 48 -0.34 -7.38 -3.85
   Public utilities SIC 49 -1.71 -2.79 -2.24
   Total 0.72 -5.70 -2.43
Table 4
(continued)
INDUSTRY 1988-92 1993-96 1988-96
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Net UI Subsidy Per $1000 of Payroll, 1988 to 1996, Massachusetts, by Industry (SUBRATE)
1988-92 1993-96 1988-96
TRADE
   Wholesale, durable SIC 50 1.51 -5.03 -1.54
   Wholesale, nondurable SIC 51 -0.07 -5.44 -2.71
   Building and hardware SIC 52 2.74 -6.21 -0.87
   General merchandise SIC 53 -1.38 -10.79 -6.21
   Food SIC 54 -5.62 -11.04 -8.11
   Auto and service stations SIC 55 2.28 -9.30 -2.65
   Apparel SIC 56 -2.80 -10.14 -6.10
   Furniture SIC 57 -0.23 -8.57 -4.00
   Eating and drinking SIC 58 -4.95 -13.47 -9.01
   Miscellaneous SIC 59 -2.48 -10.24 -6.16
   Total -1.05 -8.39 -4.49
FINANCE, INSURANCE, AND REAL ESTATE
   Depositories SIC 60 -2.02 -6.03 -3.90
   Nondepository Credit SIC 61 -1.51 -4.14 -2.92
   Brokers and dealers SIC 62 -1.82 -4.85 -3.58
   Insurance carriers SIC 63 -1.87 -4.98 -3.41
   Insurance agents SIC 64 -2.48 -6.31 -4.32
   Real estate SIC 65 1.74 -6.62 -1.94
   Investment companies SIC 67 -1.41 -3.13 -2.17
   Total -1.49 -5.41 -3.45
SERVICES
   Lodging SIC 70 -0.67 -9.19 -4.63
   Personal SIC 72 -3.37 -12.00 -7.45
   Business SIC 73 -0.20 -7.11 -3.71
   Auto repair SIC 75 2.29 -9.06 -2.95
   Miscellaneous repair SIC 76 3.32 -4.72 -0.28
   Motion picture SIC 78 -1.66 -7.46 -4.32
   Amusement SIC 79 2.69 -4.59 -1.23
   Health SIC 80 -4.76 -9.31 -7.18
   Legal SIC 81 -2.39 -5.38 -3.88
   Education SIC 82 -2.42 -11.48 -7.05
   Social SIC 83 -3.57 -12.58 -8.07
   Museum and zoos SIC 84 -2.03 -9.42 -5.54
Table 4
(continued)
INDUSTRY 1988-92 1993-96 1988-96
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  (Services continued)
   Membership organizations SIC 86 -2.78 -8.83 -5.69
   Engineering and accountingb SIC 87 0.91 -4.88 -2.34
   Private households SIC 88 -9.32 -16.07 -13.05
   Miscellaneous SIC 89 -1.42 -6.01 -1.85
   Total -1.27 -7.42 -4.44
Net UI Subsidy Per $1000 of Payroll, 1988 to 1996, Massachusetts, by Industry
(SUBRATE)
1988-92 1993-96 1988-96
ALL  INDUSTRIES 1.90 -5.02 -1.40
   AGRICULTUREc n.a. 22.92 n.a.
   MININGc n.a. -1.19 n.a.
   CONSTRUCTION 30.37 17.18 25.21
   MANUFACTURING 2.50 -3.55 -0.20
   TCPU 0.72 -5.70 -2.43
   TRADE -1.05 -8.39 -4.49
   FIRE -1.49 -5.41 -3.45
   SERVICES -1.27 -7.42 -4.44
n.a.:  Not available.
  See text definitions of SUBRATE.a
  Date for 1989-96 only.b
  Date for 1993-96 only.c
Source:  Author's calculations; Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training.
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Table 5
The Adequacy of New England’s UI Trust Fund Reserves 
According to Alternative Standards
(Percentage of Standard Attained as of 1996:Q4)












































Connecticut 13  28 39  35  40  44  44
Maine 29  55  61  61  55  71  69
Massachusetts 25  59  64  63  59  68  68
New Hampshire 61 230 234 233 234 327 295
Rhode Island 21  44  52  50  44  52  53
Vermont 97 227 237 239 256 301 300
Note: In presenting these alternative standards, the Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation defined “cost rate” as the ratio of benefits
paid out to the total wages of employees with UI coverage in any 12-month period. In general, cost rates are readily available only by
calendar year. Thus, calendar year measures are used for the computations reported in Column 2 through 7. Since the U.S. Department of
Labor reports state-by-state figures for Column 1 on a quarterly basis, the numbers in that column are based on the highest cost rate in any
12-month period. Limiting cost rates to those observed for calendar years overestimates the degree to which a state has attained a given
standard.
Source: Author’s calculations; U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, ET Handbook 394, 1995; and U.S.
Department of Labor, UI Data Summary, several issues.
Figure 1
Difference between Responses of Average 
Employer Tax Rate to Onset of a
Recession under Reserve Ratio Method
and under Benefit Ratio Method





Source: Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training.
Note:  SIC 27 is printing and publishing.  SIC 35 is non-electrical machinery, SIC 36 is electrical machinery.  SIC 38 is instruments.  T.C.P.U. stands 
for transportation, communications, and public utilities.  F.I.R.E. stands for finance, insurance, and real estate.
Figure 3
Percent of Wages Paid by Massachusetts Employers Subject to
Minimum and Maximum UI Tax Rates, by Industry 1995
 
 
Source: Massachusetts Department of Employment and Training
























Note: Data for 1995 contain 1994Q4, 1995Q1,Q2, and Q3.
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance 
Financial Data, ET Handbook No. 394, Section II; and U.S. Department of Labor, Unemployment Insurance 











































Taxes as a % of Taxable Wages












UI Taxes and Benefits as a Percent of Taxable Wages,
New England States, 1966 to 1995
Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance Financial Data , ET Handbook No. 
394, Section II: and U.S. Department of Labor, Employment Insurance Service, Division of Actuarial Services,  UI Data Summary, various 
issues.
Figure 5
Trust Fund Balance as a % of Total Wages Paid to UI Covered
Employment, New England States, 1966 to 1995
 
 
Note: Data for 1996 contain the first quarter only.













Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont
Note: The experience rating index is calculated by first computing "effective benefit charges" by taking the total 
benefits paid during the reporting period and subtracting from them the ineffective charges, inactive charges, and 
noncharges.  The remainder is then divided by the total benefits.  Data unavailable for New Hampshire for 1988 
and 1989.Source: U.S. Department of Labor.
Figure 6
Experience Rating Index
New England States, 1988 to 1995








Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhone Island Vermont
Figure 7














Index 1982 = 100
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, New England Economic Indicators .
